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#### **Reject their call for the ballot**

#### The affirmative takes the position of the Maoist, critiquing the structures that shape their lives – their knowledge production is necessarily homogenizing and draws capital from the others’ deprivation

**Chow 93** - Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Duke (Rey, Indiana University of Press, “Writing Diaspora,” 1993, p12-15, Google Books accessed 12/9/2013) //RGP \*edited for ablest language

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way ¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non-West, the Maoist turns precisely the "dis-dained" other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a gen-eralized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West. "21 Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valo-rization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subal-ternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a West-ern European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a rad-¶ ical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report expe-riences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses " raised. " In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence as representation is not an easy one for most academies to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order."22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were "oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation." As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception. The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non-Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraelis "The East is a career,"23 they remain ~~blind~~ to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

#### Their grouping of Cuba Mexico and Vebezuela is homogenizing – Knowledge is always situated and partial – they perpetuate the myth of a non-situated “ego” which conceals epistemic violence – this supports Western claims of a “God-eyed view” reproducing portrayals of the under-developed South

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The first point to discuss is the contribution of racial/ethnic and feminist ¶ subaltern perspectives to epistemological questions. The hegemonic Eurocentric ¶ paradigms that have informed western philosophy and sciences in the ¶ “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system” (Grosfoguel 2005; 2006b) for ¶ the last 500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view. ¶ Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983; Collins 1990) as ¶ well as Third World scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977) ¶ reminded us that we always speak from a particular location in the power structures. ¶ Nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and ¶ racial hierarchies of the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system“. As ¶ feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. ¶ Black feminist scholars called this perspective “afro-centric epistemology” (Collins ¶ 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American ¶ Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it “geopolitics of knowledge” (Dussel ¶ 1977) and, following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldúa (1987), I will use the term “body-politics of knowledge.” This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the ¶ fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of ¶ enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that ¶ speaks. In Western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always ¶ hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis. The “ego-politics of knowledge” of ¶ Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated “Ego”. ¶ Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are ¶ always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from ¶ the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth ¶ about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the ¶ structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks.¶ It is important here to distinguish the ‘epistemic location’ from the ‘social location’. The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consist in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemicaly like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved. I am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What I am claiming is that all knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the power relations and that this is related to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth. Rene Descartes, the founder of Modern Western Philosophy, inaugurates a new moment in the history of Western thought. He replaces God, as the foundation of knowledge in the Theo-politics of knowledge of the European Middle Ages, with (Western) Man as the foundation of knowledge in European Modern times. All the attributes of God are now extrapolated to (Western) Man. Universal Truth beyond time and space, privilege access to the laws of the Universe, and the capacity to produce scientific knowledge and theory is now placed in the mind of Western Man. The Cartesian ‘ego-cogito’ (‘I think, therefore I am’) is the foundation of modern Western sciences. By producing a dualism between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim non-situated, universal, God-eyed view knowledge. This is what the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez called the ‘point zero’ perspective of Eurocentric philosophies (Castro-Gomez 2003). The ‘point zero’ is the point of view that hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view, that is, the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of view. It is this ‘god-eye view’ that always hides its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism. Western philosophy privileges ‘ego politics of knowledge’ over the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ and the ‘body-politics of knowledge’. Historically, this has allowed Western man (the gendered term is intentionally used here) to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness, and to dismiss non-Western knowledge as particularistic and, thus, unable to achieve universality. This epistemic strategy has been crucial for Western global designs. By hiding the location of the subject of enunciation, European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination was able to construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people around the world. We went from the sixteenth century characterization of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of ‘people without history’, to the twentieth century characterization of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’. We went from the sixteenth century ‘rights of people’ (Sepulveda versus de las Casas debate in the school of Salamanca in the mid-sixteenth century), to the eighteenth century ‘rights of man’ (Enlightment philosophers), and to the late twentieth century ‘human rights’. All of these are part of global designs articulated to the simultaneous production and reproduction of an international division of labor of core/periphery that overlaps with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans/non-Europeans. However, as Enrique Dussel (1994) has reminded us, the Cartesian ‘ego cogito’ (‘I think, therefore I am’) was preceded by 150 years (since the beginnings of the European colonial expansion in 1492) of the European ‘ego conquistus’ (‘I conquer, therefore I am’). The social, economic, political and historical conditions of possibility for a subject to assume the arrogance of becoming God-like and put himself as the foundation of all Truthful knowledge was the Imperial Being, that is, the subjectivity of those who are at the center of the world because they have already conquered it. What are the decolonial implications of this epistemological critique to our knowledge production and to our concept of world-system?

#### The alternative is to vote negative to engage in academic exile – we must disengage the structures they critique and question our privilege to speak in the first place – rejection of the academy is a prerequisite to solvency

**Biswas 7** – politics at Whitman (Shampa, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium 36)

Said has written extensively and poignantly about his own exilic conditions as a Palestinian schooled in the Western literary canon and living in the heart of US empire.27 But more importantly, he has also articulated exile as a ‘style of thought and habitation’ which makes possible certain kinds of ontological and epistemological openings. Speaking of exile as a ‘metaphorical condition’,28 Said describes it as ‘the state of never being fully adjusted’, of ‘always feeling outside’, of ‘restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’, of ‘a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness’. Exile, he says, ‘is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is a marginal figure outside the comforts of privilege, power, being-at-homeness’.29 Not just ‘foreigners’ but ‘lifelong members of a society’, can be such ‘outsiders’, so that ‘(e)ven if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and comfortable’.30 What Said privileges here is an intellectual orientation, rather than any identarian claims to knowledge; there is much to learn in that for IR scholars. In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans.31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination.32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad.34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own.35 It is fair to say that the jostling and unsettling of the nation-state that critical International Relations scholars have contributed to has still done little to dislodge the centrality of the nation-state in much of International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses. Raising questions about the state-centricity of intellectual works becomes even more urgent in the contemporary context in which the hyperpatriotic surge following the events of 11 September 2001 has made considerable inroads into the US academy. The attempt to make the academy a place for the renewal of the nation-state project is troubling in itself; for IR scholars in the US, such attempts can only limit the reach of a global sensibility precisely at a time when such globality is even more urgently needed. Said warns against the inward pull of patriotism in times of emergency and crisis, and argues that even for an intellectual who speaks for a particular cause, the task is to ‘universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others’.36 He is adamant that this is the case even for beleaguered groups such as the Palestinians whose very survival is dependent on formulating their demands in a nationalist idiom.37 American intellectuals, as members of a superpower with enormous global reach and where dissension in the public realm is noticeably absent, carry special responsibility in this regard.38 What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’,39 and second, an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable.40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological givenness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’.41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

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#### The affirmative’s understanding of critical pedagogy reproduces humanism

**Bell and Russell 2k** (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to **infuse the world with their creative presence**, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a, pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view was beginning to take shape. To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, self, and community, and thus bring into focus the underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’ interdependence with the more-than-human world. This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed to be free agents separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). It has also been used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks, queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is, animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989, p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988). This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through which we set ourselves apart and above.This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that “it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman. Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden (1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything more than material objects in nature is nil” (p. 108). What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994) uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural, somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).

#### Humanism is the original hierarchy – we need politics that can respect more than human life. Their politics dooms us to a future that endlessly repeats the oppression of the status quo.

**Best, 7** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets,the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.

#### The alternative is to vote negative to embrace an ethic of organism – this is the only way to solve dualisms that guarantee exclusion and ongoing ecological crisis

**Henning’9** (Brian, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University in Spokane, WA. Henning is author of the award winning book The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive Cosmos. His current scholarship and teaching focus on the interconnections among ethics, metaphysics, and aesthetics, especially as they relate to the ethics of global climate change. E-mail: [henning@gonzaga.edu](mailto:henning@gonzaga.edu), “Trusting in the 'Efficacy of Beauty': A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy,” MUSE, AM)

Final truths (whether in religion, morality, or science) are unattainable not only due to the finitude and fallibility of human inquirers, but because we live in what the theologian John F. Haught calls an "unfinished universe" (2004). The notion that one could achieve anything like a final or absolute formulation in any field of study presupposes that one's object is static. Thankfully, we do not live in such a universe. Over the last century scientists have consistently discovered that the universe is not a plenum of lifeless, valueless facts mechanistically determined by absolute laws. Rather, we live in a processive cosmos that is a dynamic field of events organized in complex webs of interdependence, rather than a collection of objects interacting via physical laws. The intuition that the universe is fundamentally a clockwork machine successfully guided science in the wake of Newton's inspirational formulation of the laws of mechanics, but this metaphor proved increasingly inadequate as Newton's work was supplanted in the early 20th century by both general relativity and quantum mechanics. Even at its peak, the mechanical metaphor created difficulties for thinking about human beings, who were never effectively illuminated by the assumption that they were complex machines. At the level of elementary particles, quantum mechanics disclosed a world of wave-like particles spread out in space and inextricably entangled with other particles in the local environment. The notion of autonomous "individual" particles disappeared. Although all metaphors are misleading to some degree, the metaphor of the world as an evolving organism has become more helpful than the old mechanical model of the world as a clock. This, in a sense, is the founding insight of Whitehead's "philosophy of organism," which took as its starting point the view that individuals—particles, plants, and people—are not discrete facts walled off from each other but parts of complex and intersecting wholes. Conceived of as an organic process, every individual is inextricably intertwined and interconnected with every other. The fundamental reality is no longer individual entities but rather the ongoing processes by which they interact and create novel structures. Once we recognize that every individual—from a subatomic event to a majestic sequoia—brings together the diverse elements in its world in just this way, just here, and just now, we see that nothing is entirely devoid of value and beauty. This process whereby many diverse individuals are brought together into the unity of one new individual, which will eventually add its energy to future individuals, characterizes the most basic feature of reality and is what Whitehead calls the "category of creativity." On this view, reality is best characterized not as an unending march of vacuous facts, but as an incessant "creative advance" striving toward ever-richer forms of beauty and value. Noting its emphasis on interdependence and interrelation, many scholars have rightly noted that Whitehead's metaphysics is uniquely suited to provide a basis for making sense of our relationship to the natural world.10 Decades before modern ecologists taught us about ecosystems, Whitehead was describing individuals as interrelated societies of societies. No individual, Whitehead insisted, can be understood apart from its relationship to others.11 Indeed, whereas ecologists only explain how it is that macroscopic individuals are related in interdependent systems, Whitehead's organic metaphysics of process provides a rich account of how individuals at every level of complexity—from subatomic events to ecosystems, and from oak trees to galaxies—arise and are perpetuated.12What is more, Whitehead's philosophy of organism places a premium on an individual's dependence on and relationship to the larger wholes of which it is a part without making the mistake of subsuming the individual into that larger whole.13 With the philosophy of organism we need not choose between either the one or the many, "the many become one and are increased by one" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 21). By providing a robust alternative to the various forms of reductive physicalism and destructive dualism that currently dominate many branches of science and philosophy, the philosophy of organism is an ideal position from which to address the complex social and ecological challenges confronting us. First, if who and what I am is intimately and inextricably linked to everyone and everything else in the universe, then I begin to recognize that my own flourishing and the flourishing of others are not independent. Not only do I intimately and unavoidably depend on others in order to sustain myself, with varying degrees of relevance, how I relate to my environment is constitutive of who and what I am. As we are quickly learning, we ignore our interdependence with our wider environment at our own peril. Moreover, in helping us to recognizing our connection to and dependence on our larger environment, an organic model forces us to abandon the various dualisms that have for too long allowed us to maintain the illusion that we are set off from the rest of nature. Adopting an organic metaphysics of process forces us finally to step down from the self-constructed pedestal from which we have for millennia surveyed nature and finally to embrace the lesson so compellingly demonstrated by Darwin: humans are not a singular exception to, but rather a grand exemplification of, the processes at work in the universe.14 In this way we ought finally to reject not only the materialisms of contemporary science, but also the dualisms that often undergird our religious, social, political, and moral understandings of ourselves and our relationship to the natural world. As John Dewey concisely put it, "man is within nature, not a little god outside" (1929, 351). Until we shed our self-deluding arrogance and recognize that who and what we are as a species is fundamentally bound up in and dependent on the wider scope of events unfolding in the universe, the ecological crisis will only deepen. Taken seriously, our understanding of reality as composed of vibrant, organically interconnected achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic effect on how we conceiveof ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations—morality can no longer be limited merely to inter-human relations. In rejecting modernity's notion of lifeless matter, we come to recognize that every form of actuality has value in and for itself, for others, and for the whole. In aiming at and achieving an end for itself, every individual—no matter how ephemeral or seemingly insignificant—has intrinsic value for itself and in achieving this self-value it thereby becomes a value for others and for the whole of reality. Every individual, from the most fleeting event in deep space to centuries old redwoods, has value for itself, for others, and for the whole of reality and it is from this character of reality that our moral obligations derive (Whitehead 1938, 111). Given that every individual in our universe, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, has some degree of value, the scope of our direct moral concern15 can exclude nothing. Thus, in rather sharp contrast to the invidious forms of anthropocentrism that characterize much of western moral thought, our scope of direct moral concern cannot be limited to humans, to sentient beings, or even to all living beings. Morality is not anthropocentric, but neither is it sentientcentric or biocentric. In affirming the value of every individual, we must begin to recognize that every relation is potentially a moral relation. As Whitehead vividly puts it, "The destruction of a man, or of an insect, or of a tree, or of the Parthenon, may be moral or immoral.… Whether we destroy or whether we preserve, our action is moral if we have thereby safeguarded the importance [or value] of experience so far as it depends on that concrete instance in the world's history" (1938, 14–15). Morality is not merely about how we ought to act toward and among other human beings, other sentient beings, or even other living beings. Morality is fundamentally about how we comport ourselves in the world, how we relate to and interact with every form of existence. To summarize our position thus far, in recognizing the fallibility of human knowers and the dynamic nature of the known, a Whiteheadian approach insists that moral philosophers steadfastly recognize the limits of moral inquiry, carefully navigating between the rocks of dogmatic absolutism and gross relativism. The recognition of nature's dynamism furthermore requires that philosophers abandon finally the artificial bifurcations (dualisms) and unjustified reductions (physicalism and materialism) that distort and destroy the interdependent relationships constituting reality. The world revealed by the last century of scientific investigation can no longer support a mechanistic model that describes the natural world in terms of vacuous facts determined by absolute laws. In its place, I am defending the adoption of an organic model that conceives of reality as vibrant, open, and processive. On this model, individuals are conceived of as ongoing events situated in vast webs of interdependence, each achieving value for themselves, for others, and for the whole of reality.

#### The role of your ballot is to endorse the most liberating scholarship

**Best 7** [Steven Best, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, 2007 JCAS 5.2]

Commonalities of Oppression¶ “Compassion, in which all ethics must take root, can only attain its full breadth and depth¶ if it embraces all living creatures and does not limit itself to humankind.” Albert¶ Schweitzer¶ “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans¶ any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men.” Alice¶ Walker¶ The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals,¶ and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to¶ humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi¶ Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited¶ humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and¶ technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these¶ connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable¶ place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the¶ survival of our endangered planet.”40 The most important objective of the book, indeed, is to promote a new ethics and¶ mode of perception. Eternal Treblinka affects a radical shift in the way we understand¶ oppression, domination, power, and hierarchy. It is both an effect of these changes, and,¶ hopefully, a catalyst to deepen political resistance to corporate domination and hierarchy¶ in all forms. Given its broad framing that highlights the crucial importance of human¶ domination over animals for slavery, racism, colonialism, and anti-Semitism, Eternal¶ Treblinka could and should revolutionize fields such as Holocaust studies, colonial and¶ postcolonial studies, and African American studies. But this can happen only if, to be¶ blunt, humanists, “radicals,” and “progressives” in academia and society in general¶ remove their speciesist blinders in order to grasp the enormity of animal suffering, its¶ monumental moral wrong in needless and unjustifiable exploitation of animals, and the¶ larger structural matrix in which human-over-human domination and human-over-animal¶ domination emerge from the same prejudiced, power-oriented, and pathological violent¶ mindset. Political resistance in western nations, above all, will advance a quantum leap¶ when enough people recognize that the movements for human liberation, animal¶ liberation, and earth liberation are so deeply interconnected that no one objective is¶ possible without the realization of the others.¶ A truly revolutionary social theory and movement seeks to emancipate members¶ of one species from oppression, but rather all species and the earth itself from the grip of¶ human domination and colonization. A future “revolutionary movement” worthy of the¶ name will grasp the ancient roots of hierarchy, such as took shape with the emergence of¶ agricultural societies, and incorporate a new ethics of nature that overcomes¶ instrumentalism and hierarchies of all forms.41 Humanism is a form of prejudice, bias,¶ bigotry, and destructive supremacism; it is a stale, antiquated, immature, and dysfunction¶ dogma; it is a form of fundamentalism, derived from the Church of “Reason” and, in¶ comparison with the vast living web of life still humming and interacting, however¶ tattered and damaged, it is, writ large, a tribal morality – in which killing a member of¶ your own “tribe” is wrong but any barbarity unleashed on another tribe is acceptable if¶ not laudable. Ultimately, humanism is pseudo-universalism, a Kantian quackery, a¶ hypocritical pretense to ethics, a dysfunctional human identity and cosmological map¶ helping to drive us ever-deeper into an evolutionary cul-de-sac.

### 1nc

#### **Interpretation and violation – the affirmative can only claim advantages off the desirability of topical government action**

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Or requires choice between between the list of countries in the topic

**Macmillian Dictionary No Date** (“or” http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/or)

used for connecting possibilities or choices. In a list, "or" is usually used only before the last possibility or choice

#### **Vote neg**

#### **1) Stasis – they prevent clash because they unpredictably shift the debate and don’t give us good ground – they justify an infinite number of k affs that we can never be ready for – this causes vague discussions which don’t allow decision-making skills or truth-testing which turns case**

#### **2) Fairness – debate is a game – shifting the framework of debate arbitrarily skews the round in favor of the aff – this creates a workload that no one can keep up with – that kills participation and fun**

#### **3) Switch side debate is good and solves all their offense – they can read their kritik in half their rounds but they have to defend the topic sometimes – this is key to opening the debate to new perspectives and preventing ideological absolutism**

#### A stable point of controversy is key

**Steinberg and Freeley ‘13**

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, Argumentation and Debate Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, Thirteen Edition

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

### case

#### Util inevitable and good

**Kymlicka, 90** (Will, Professor of Philosophy and Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy, Queen's University at Kingston, Recurrent Visiting Professor, Central European University, “Contemporary Political Philosophy,” Clarendon Press, pg. 10-11, Tashma)

There are two features of utilitarianism that make it an attractive theory of political morality. Firstly, the goal which utilitarians seek to promote does not depend on the existence of God, or a soul, or any other dubious metaphysical entity. Some moral theories say that what matters is the condition of one`s soul, or that one should live according to God`s Divine Will, or that one’s life goes best by having everlasting life in another realm of being. Many people have thought that morality is incoherent without these religious notions. Without God, all we are left with is a set of rules——‘do this’, ‘don`t do that`—which lack any point or purpose. It is not clear why anyone would think this of utilitarianism. The good it seeks to promote—happiness, or welfare, or well-being—is something that we all pursue in our own lives, and in the lives of those we love, Utilitarians just demand that the pursuit of human welfare or utility (I will be using these terms interchangeably) be done impartially, for everyone in society. Whether or not we are God’s children, or have a soul, or free will, we can suffer or be happy, we can all be better or worse off. No matter how secular we are, we cannot deny that happiness is valuable, since it is something we value in our own lives. A distinct but related attraction is utilitarianism’s ‘consequentialism`. I will discuss what exactly that means later on, but for the moment its importance is that it requires that we check to see whether the act or policy in question actually does some identifiable good or not. We have all had to deal with people who say that something——homosexuality, for example (or gambling, dancing, drinking, swearing, etc.)-—is morally wrong, and yet are incapable of pointing to any bad consequences that arise from it. Consequentialism prohibits such apparently arbitrary moral prohibitions. It demands of anyone who condemns something as morally wrong that they show who is wronged, i.e. they must show how s0meone`s life is made worse off. Likewise, consequentialism says that something is morally good only if it makes someone’s life better off. Many other moral theories, even those motivated by a concern for human welfare, seem to consist in a set of rules to be followed, whatever the consequences. But utilitarianism is 110t just another set of rules, another set of ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’. Utilitarianism provides a test to ensure that such rules serve some useful function. Consequentialism is also attractive because it conforms to our intuitions about the difference between morality and other spheres. If someone calls certain kinds of consensual sexual activity morally wrong because they are `improper’, and yet cannot point to anyone who suffers from them, then we might respond that the idea of ‘proper` behaviour being employed is not a moral one. Such claims about proper behaviour are more like aesthetic claims, or an appeal to etiquette or convention. Someone might say that punk rock is ‘improper’, not legitimate music at all. But that would be an aesthetic criticism, not a moral one. To say that homosexual sex is ‘improper’, without being able to point to any bad consequences, is like saying that Bob Dylan sings inproperly—it may be true, but it is not a moral criticism. There are standards of propriety that are not consequentialist, but we think that morality is more important than mere etiquette, and consequentialism helps account for that difference. Consequentialism also seems to provide a straightforward method for resolving moral questions. Finding the morally right answer becomes a matter of measuring changes in human welfare, not of consulting spiritual leaders, or relying on obscure traditions. Utilitarianism, historically, was therefore quite progressive. It demanded that customs and authorities which had oppressed people for centuries be tested against the standard of human improvement (‘man is the measure of all things`). At its best, utilitarianism is a strong weapon against prejudice and superstition, providing a standard and a procedure that challenge those who claim authority over us in the name of morality.

#### The aff commodifies the suffering of others for your ballot – this creates a debate economy where we use scenarios of suffering like chess pieces in our sick game – this creates worse intellectual imperialism

**Baudrillard 94** – dead French philosopher (Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71) //RGP

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### The 1AC’s gesture of recognition toward the subaltern leaves UNTOUCHED the basic structures of oppression — this re-inscribes and legitimizes the coloniality of power.

**Maldonado-Torres 8** – Nelson Maldonado-Torres 8, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, ‘8 [Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 148-50] //DDI13

It is not possible to understand fully the difference between Fanon's and Honneth's critical takes on Hegel without considering their divergent views on the human subject and on the subjective motivations behind the struggle for recognition. Honneth correctly argues that when Hegel articulated the notion of a struggle for recognition he was definitely leaving behind a tradition of social and political thought that went back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, according to which self-preservation played the primary motivating role in leading humans to form states, political bodies, and institutions. According to Hegel, conflicts among humans were not to be traced back to a motive of self-preservation, but, as Honneth describes them, to moral impulses-that is, to the recognition of one's identity and personality. What Hegel, however, continues to hold, in line with dominant trends of political theory in his time, and what Honneth does not examine in his critical reflections on Hegel, is the extent to which the "right of property" functions as the primary marker of self-identity and personality. As a result, the struggle for recognition becomes primarily a struggle to be recognized as a proprietor. Hegel inherits this idea from a liberal tradition that defined human fraternity in terms of the coexistence in a "civil society" of autonomous individuals with rights of property--Locke's felicitous definition. Consider that for the Hegel of the Jena writings what initiated the struggle between persons was "theft," which made it clear that a violation of property was viewed as a violation of the person. Honor could only be regained in a life-and-death struggle. What changes in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that the life-and-death struggle, now subsumed in the dialectics of Spirit, gives rise to two modes of consciousness: one is independent and for-itself, while the other is dependent and takes the form of an object or thing; the former is lord, the latter is bondsman. Property becomes now a more complex category since even subjects can collapse into the category of objects, things, and possessions. The slave works on the property of the master and objectifies himself in it, while the master enjoys the product of the slave's work--from here comes the Marxist theory of alienation, which Marx later applied to economics and came up with the notion of surplus value. We have seen all of this already. What I want to add now is that there is a presumption that the relation between the subject and property is basic. Freedom is the objectification of the subjectivity of the individual. The end result of this is that the freedom and equality of the subject tend to collapse frequently into the claim for freedom and equality in the process of coming to possess something. We are free to possess what we want and equal in our chances to get what we want." This gives a dangerous self-referential character to the politics of recognition that threatens coalition politics and that more often than not leads only to minimal structural changes at the political and economic levels. The problem with the politics of recognition is therefore not so much that it dissolves questions of redistribution into questions of recognition as some have argued." The problem, in contrast, resides in self-centered claims for redistribution. In other words, the danger is w hen the struggle for recognition is reduced to questions about the respect, freedom, and equality of subjects who aim to overturn the system of lordship and bondage by coming finally to possess something of their own and to be recognized as proprietors. This conception of the struggle for recognition is fated to leave untouched the basic structure of the oppressive system that creates pathological modes of recognition and to hinder the chances for the formation of what has been aptly called "a coalition politics of receptive generosity.” In contrast to conceptions of the struggle for recognition articulated in terms of cultural identity or in terms of claims for possession and access to goods, Fanon discovered in his exploration of the lived experience of the black that one of the main challenges confronted by blacks in a racial society is not only that they are not recognized as people who can possess things, but that they are not recognized as people who can give things. Demands to be able to give are, in this respect, more radical than demands for possession. The master, under pressure, can allow the slave to have "things," but he will not recognize that he needs what the slave has. For the master, whatever the slave touches decreases in quality and value. Thus, even ifhe enters into commerce with the slave, the master will devalue the extent of the slave's contributions. Fanon was well aware of this dimension of the system of lordship and bondage. It was always the Negro teacher, the Negro doctor; brittle as I was becoming, I shivered at the slightest pretext. I knew, for instance, that if the physician made a mistake it would be the end of him and of all those who came after him. What could one expect, after all, from a Negro physician? As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no nonsense, under any conditions! The black physician can never be sure how close he is to disgrace. I tell you, I was walled in: No exception was made for my refined manners, or my knowledge of literature, or my understanding of the quantum theory. (BSWM 1l7). Fanon suggests here that while coming to possess things or gaining abilities may be a necessary condition of the process of achieving liberation, it is certainly not sufficient and it should not become in itself the telos or goal of the process. The problem is that the logic of lordship and bondage may very well continue after formal concessions of rights of property. The master still resists opening himself to the Other and entering into the logic of ordinary ethical intersubjective contact. But why is it that the master resists accepting the gift or recognizing the Other as someone who can give? The answer should be clear by now: it makes evident the incompleteness of the master. Lordship requires impenetrability, while giving necessitates openness and receptivity. Giving in this sense represents the paradigmatic transgressive act. If giving is so dangerous it is not so much because it puts the other in debt, but because in the colonial context it requires an original act of openness that the master fundamentally resists." The master can easily pay any debt; what he cannot do is to open himself and to be receptive to the gift of the slave. This transaction violates the very meaning and purpose of the logic of lordship and bondage.

#### Their speech act makes the subaltern visible to the western observer – this reaffirms hierarchies of coloniality and lionizes western activists while re-victimizing the other

**Bystrom, 12** - Kerry L. is Assistant Professor of English and Director of the Research Program on Humanitarianism at the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut, Storrs, "Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms (review)." Human Rights Quarterly 34.4 (2012): 1214-1217. Project MUSE)//A-Berg

\*gender modified

Over the past decade, a growing body of work has brought humanities perspectives to human rights scholarship and challenged still widely-held assumptions that the task of advancing human rights is most fundamentally a matter of law and politics. Texts such as Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith's Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition (2004), Anne Cubilié's Women Witnessing Terror: Testimony and the Cultural Politics of Human Rights (2005), and Joseph R. Slaughter's Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form and International Law (2007) have inaugurated a lively and expansive discussion about the work of culture and representation in human rights activism, not to mention its centrality in shaping the larger social imaginary within which this activism takes place. Wendy S. Hesford's provocative and important book Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms adds further vitality to this discussion, as it shifts attention from the narrative to the visual axis and mounts a compelling argument about the significance of notions and practices of visibility and spectatorship in contemporary human rights work. Hesford poses international human rights as a regime constitutively bound up with practices of vision and discourses of sight; she notes that "[t]he history of human rights can be told as a history of selective and differential visibility, which has positioned certain bodies, populations, and nations as objects of recognition and granted others the power and means to look and to confer recognition."1 From this perspective, human rights activism—as it takes place across the "truth-telling genres" she surveys, from photography to documentary film and theater, testimony, and ethnography— becomes a "spectacular rhetoric" aimed at making formerly "invisible" subjects "visible" to the Western and often specifically American audience of rights holders.2 Moments or "scenes" of this activism participate in and extend what Hesford calls the larger "human rights spectacle," not a single image or set of images but "the incorporation of subjects (individuals, communities, nations) through imaging technologies and discourses of vision and violation into the normative frameworks of a human [End Page 1214] rights internationalism based on United Nations (UN) documents and treaties."3 As Hesford deftly argues, being made visible through this process of incorporation is not all it is cracked up to be, because the human rights spectacle relies on structures of sight that may ultimately enable human rights abuses to continue (about which more below). Yet, she also rightly points out, "the human rights spectacle is not fully allied with abusive power" and activists can mine its very paradoxes and complications to open up new ways of seeing.4 How might the human rights spectacle perpetuate—or at the very least not fundamentally alter the structure of—violation? The basic argument to this end is set forth in Chapter One, "Human Rights Visions and Recognitions," a theoretical chapter that explains the "ocular epistemology" or visibility-based system of knowledge through which human rights developed and connects it with what is posed as the central problem of "recognition." Recognition, Hesford argues—and in dialogue with a sometimes-dizzying array of thinkers from the fields of politics, philosophy, literary theory, and performance studies—has been the paradigm through which human rights internationalism recruits and defines human subjects. In the context of human rights, it is tied to spectacular scenes of trauma and suffering, where the subject of human rights discourse becomes visible through ~~her~~ [their] representation as a feminized victim with whom the spectator must sympathize or identify. The problem with this paradigm, Hesford argues, is that it often re-affirms the self of the Western, neoliberal spectator rather than enabling true (and materially based) response to the generally non-Western rights claimant. Hesford notes that the rights claimant's coding as "victim" further means that she is [they are] incorporated into the spectator's self—and into the framework of human rights—in a manner that constrains ~~her~~ [their] agency and pegs ~~her~~ [them] to a relation of inferiority. Phrased more pointedly, recognition and the attendant incorporation of previously "invisible" subjects by US audiences often perpetuates hierarchical visions of human rights bound up with capitalism and concerned mainly with rescuing traumatized women and children from the Global South. Such visions lionize Western activists and activism as they re-victimize the "victims" of abuse and obscure the material contexts and transnational interests that allow abuses to occur. By participating in this visual economy, activist scenes, quite contrary to their intentions, can be complicit in reproducing the status quo of global power and inequality in which violation is rooted. Lest this sound too abstract, Hesford gives concrete examples in each of the chapters that follow, which present case studies of activism surrounding the War on Terror (Chapter Two: "Staging Terror Spectacles"), rape warfare (Chapter Three: "Witnessing Rape Warfare: Suspending the Spectacle"), global sex work and trafficking in women (Chapter Four: "Global Sex Work, Victim Identities and Cybersexualities") and infringements of children's rights (Chapter Five: "Spectacular Childhoods: Sentimentality and the Politics of (In)visibility"). For instance, in "Staging Terror Spectacles," Hesford shows how the use of the Abu Ghraib photographs in the 2004 International Center for Photography exhibition "Inconvenient [End Page 1215] Evidence," meant to criticize US abuses of human rights in Iraq, intersects with the George W. Bush administration's narrative of the US as a traumatized nation that underwrote the Iraq war.5 "Spectacular Childhoods"—one of the book's most compelling chapters—similarly shows how good intentions go awry through a sensitive and nuanced reading of Ross Kauffman and Zana Briski's Academy Award-winning documentary about children from a red-light district in Calcutta, Born Into Brothels (2004). While careful not to dismiss the positive achievements of the film, Hesford argues that its staging of a version of the recognition paradigm described above—one in which exploited and impoverished children move beyond their trauma by learning to express themselves in art, and in this way claim visibility in the international community—can reinforce counterproductive human rights visions. The film "recreat[es] the spectacle of salvation" through Briski's actions as an activist art teacher in Calcutta and reinforces "Western humanitarianism's investment in transnational sentimentality and capitalist consumption."6 Not only may this perpetuate colonialist stereotypes of the unfit "third world" parent and lead to regressive policies such as child removal, but it also ignores certain effective forms of local activism and obscures many of the intersecting structural conditions that narrow life options for the children featured in the film. Configuring the visibility of these children through the dominant forms of the human rights spectacle, then, according to Hesford, may not be the most helpful way to resolve their problems. This is a strong (albeit justified) critique. As already mentioned, however, Spectacular Rhetorics moves beyond critique to a positive agenda, which helps Hesford's book avoid the trap of a facile or overly zealous rejection of human rights that can characterize certain strands of humanistic inquiry into the field. Throughout the book Hesford traces forms of advocacy that may exploit or unsettle the dominant human rights spectacle and offer modes of responding to the erstwhile "victims" of human rights abuse that reconfigure or work beyond the recognition paradigm. Key to this endeavor are activist scenes that—by doing more than "simply turn[ing] passive or silent voices into compelling speech, or reproduc[ing] the traumatic real" and instead creating scenes that "reconfigur[e] witnessing in rhetorical and ethical terms"—help spectators cultivate an active and complex practice of witnessing.7 This positive project is outlined theoretically in the Introduction and Chapter One, and gains depth and clarity in the case studies. Of particular note is "Witnessing Rape Warfare: Suspending the Spectacle." Here, Hesford examines a series of what she shows to be ethical and potentially useful representations of rape in the former Yugoslavia, including Midge Mackenzie's documentary film The Sky: A Silent Witness (1995) and Melanie Friend's visual and acoustic exhibition Homes and Gardens (1996), as well as Mandy Jacobson and Karmen Jelincic's documentary film Calling the Ghosts: A Story about Rape, War and Women (1996). The first two pieces, [End Page 1216] Hesford argues, "suspend the [human rights] spectacle" by boycotting the image of the rape victim—in the first case, by refusing to show the visual image of a woman giving oral testimony about her rape and posing instead the image of water and the sky, and in the second by juxtaposing another set of oral testimonies with ordinary or intimate images of domestic life in Yugoslavia before the war.8 Hesford shows how the discordance created in these pieces between searing spoken testimony and non-spectacular visual images can help to draw attention to the dangers of identification or recognition, and may prompt in the spectator an awareness of the "crisis of witnessing" that seeing or hearing testimony should prompt—ultimately producing what Hesford, after Dominick LaCapra, calls "empathetic unsettlement."9 This is a move away from recognition through identification to a more nuanced interaction that respects otherness even as it allows for connection. Calling the Ghosts goes even further towards turning spectators into ethical witnesses, Hesford argues, as it foregrounds the status of rape "victims" as survivors and activists; self-consciously stages the dilemmas of representation; troubles the notion that legal recognition is the end-point for the women in question; and calls for ongoing global response. As Hesford puts it, "the differentiated politics of recognition and reflexive witnessing that Calling the Ghosts puts forth may provide a model for the emergence of new transnational publics to offset the nationalist politics of recognition and the spectacular gaze of the international community in the face of wars and other violent conflicts."10 Overall, Spectacular Rhetorics is a timely and resonant book that clearly demonstrates "the rhetorical force that visual media exert in mediating the public's engagement with human rights principles and inscribing human rights internationalism into the texts of global capitalism and its nationalist and militarist correlates."11 Its casting of human rights advocacy as a "spectacular rhetoric" is a move that opens exciting ground for future research. Further, the book is carefully organized such that each case study extends and enriches the theoretical questions advanced in the opening chapters, raising new directions for critical inquiry and presenting both challenges and opportunities for current human rights activists. Spectacular Rhetorics might make for demanding reading for non-humanities scholars, in part because of the tendency to re-route assertions through citations from other scholars and in part because of its reliance on a dense theoretical vocabulary. But the book's potential difficulty also stems from the fact that it makes critiques that can feel quite close to home and provides readers with a thick accretion of ideas that take time to work through and grapple with—and these are surely aspects of scholarship that should be celebrated. Hesford's book deserves this time, thought, and celebration. [End Page 1217]

# 2nc

#### Determining ethics and our relationship to the world comes first – this is a prerequisite to knowledge and action

**Weston 9** – Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy at Elon University, 2009 [The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher p. 9-11]

If the world is a collection of more or less ﬁxed facts to which we  must respond, then the task of ethics is to systematize and unify our  responses. This is the expected view, once again so taken for granted  as to scarcely even appear as a “view” at all. Epistemology is prior to  ethics. Responding to the world follows upon knowing it—and what  could be more sensible or responsible than that? If the world is not  “given,” though—if the world is what it seems to be in part because  we have made it that way, as I have been suggesting, and if therefore  the process of inviting its further possibilities into the light is funda-  mental to ethics itself—then our very knowledge of the world, of the  possibilities of other animals and the land and even ourselves in relation  to them, follows upon “invitation,” and ethics must come ﬁ rst. Ethics  is prior to epistemology—or, as Cheney and I do not say in the paper  but probably should have said, what really emerges is another kind of  epistemology—“etiquette,” in our speciﬁ c sense, as epistemology.  But then of course we are also speaking of something sharply  different from “ethics” as usually understood. We are asked not for a  set of well-defended general moral commitments in advance, but rather  for something more visceral and instinctual, a mode of comportment more than a mode of commitment, more ﬂeshy and more vulnerable.  Etiquette so understood requires us to take risks, to offer trust before  we know whether or how the offer will be received, and to move with  awareness, civility, and grace in a world we understand to be capable  of response. Thus Cheney and I conclude that ethical action itself must be “ﬁ rst and foremost an attempt to open up possibilities, to enrich  the world” rather than primarily an attempt to respond to the world  as already known.

 Cheney, true to his nature, also takes the argument on a more  strenuous path, exploring indigenous views of ceremony and ritual.  Once again the question of epistemology turns out to be central.  Euro-Americans, Cheney says, want to know what beliefs are encoded  in the utterances of indigenous peoples. We treat their utterances as  propositional representations of Indigenous worlds. But what if these  utterances function, instead, primarily to produce these worlds? Cheney  cites the indigenous scholar Sam Gill on the fundamentally performa-  tive function of language. When Gill asks Navajo elders what prayers  mean, he reports, they tell him “not what messages prayers carry, but  what prayers do.” More generally, Gill asserts that “the importance of  religion as it is practiced by the great body of religious persons for  whom religion is a way of life [is] a way of creating, discovering, and  communicating worlds of meaning largely through ordinary and com-  mon actions and behavior.”11  What then, Cheney and I ask, if this performative dimension of language is fundamental not just in indigenous or obviously religious   settings, but generally? How we speak, how we move, how we carry  on, all the time, also literally brings all sorts of worlds into being—and  thus, again, the ethical challenge put mindful speech, care, and respect  ﬁ rst. Indeed we would now go even further. Here it is not so much  that epistemology comes ﬁ rst but that, in truth, it simply fades away.  The argument is not the usual suggestion that the West has misunder-  stood the world, got it wrong, and that we now need to “go back” to  the Indians to get it right. Cheney is arguing that understanding the  world is not really the point in the ﬁ rst place. We are not playing a  truth game at all. What matters is how we relate to things, not what  things are in themselves. Front, center, and always, the world responds.  The great task is not knowledge but relationship.

#### The role of your ballot is to endorse the most liberating scholarship

**Best 7** [Steven Best, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, 2007 JCAS 5.2]

Commonalities of Oppression¶ “Compassion, in which all ethics must take root, can only attain its full breadth and depth¶ if it embraces all living creatures and does not limit itself to humankind.” Albert¶ Schweitzer¶ “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans¶ any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men.” Alice¶ Walker¶ The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals,¶ and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to¶ humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi¶ Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited¶ humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and¶ technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these¶ connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable¶ place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the¶ survival of our endangered planet.”40 The most important objective of the book, indeed, is to promote a new ethics and¶ mode of perception. Eternal Treblinka affects a radical shift in the way we understand¶ oppression, domination, power, and hierarchy. It is both an effect of these changes, and,¶ hopefully, a catalyst to deepen political resistance to corporate domination and hierarchy¶ in all forms. Given its broad framing that highlights the crucial importance of human¶ domination over animals for slavery, racism, colonialism, and anti-Semitism, Eternal¶ Treblinka could and should revolutionize fields such as Holocaust studies, colonial and¶ postcolonial studies, and African American studies. But this can happen only if, to be¶ blunt, humanists, “radicals,” and “progressives” in academia and society in general¶ remove their speciesist blinders in order to grasp the enormity of animal suffering, its¶ monumental moral wrong in needless and unjustifiable exploitation of animals, and the¶ larger structural matrix in which human-over-human domination and human-over-animal¶ domination emerge from the same prejudiced, power-oriented, and pathological violent¶ mindset. Political resistance in western nations, above all, will advance a quantum leap¶ when enough people recognize that the movements for human liberation, animal¶ liberation, and earth liberation are so deeply interconnected that no one objective is¶ possible without the realization of the others.¶ A truly revolutionary social theory and movement seeks to emancipate members¶ of one species from oppression, but rather all species and the earth itself from the grip of¶ human domination and colonization. A future “revolutionary movement” worthy of the¶ name will grasp the ancient roots of hierarchy, such as took shape with the emergence of¶ agricultural societies, and incorporate a new ethics of nature that overcomes¶ instrumentalism and hierarchies of all forms.41 Humanism is a form of prejudice, bias,¶ bigotry, and destructive supremacism; it is a stale, antiquated, immature, and dysfunction¶ dogma; it is a form of fundamentalism, derived from the Church of “Reason” and, in¶ comparison with the vast living web of life still humming and interacting, however¶ tattered and damaged, it is, writ large, a tribal morality – in which killing a member of¶ your own “tribe” is wrong but any barbarity unleashed on another tribe is acceptable if¶ not laudable. Ultimately, humanism is pseudo-universalism, a Kantian quackery, a¶ hypocritical pretense to ethics, a dysfunctional human identity and cosmological map¶ helping to drive us ever-deeper into an evolutionary cul-de-sac.

#### Even if you only conclude that the 1ac made an “oversight” in failing to mention non-human oppression, you should still vote negative --- that very omission is evidence of their thinking being structured by anthropocentrism

**Medina 11** – prof @ Vanderbilt

(Jose, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, Foucault Studies, No. 12, pp. 9-35, October 2011)

In the second place, by undoing established historical continuities, a counter- history reflects and produces discontinuous moments in a people’s past, gaps that are passed over in silence, interstices in the socio-historical fabric of a community that have received no attention. This is what we can call, by symmetry with the previous point, the principle of discontinuity. Foucault describes it in the following way: This counter-history “also breaks the continuity of glory.” It reveals that the light—the famous dazzling effect of power—is not something that petrifies, solidifies, and immobilizes the entire social body, and thus keeps it in order; it is in fact a divisive light that illuminates one side of the social body but leaves the other side in shadow or casts it into darkness. A counter-history is the dark history of those peoples who have been kept in the shadows, a history that speaks ‚from within the shadows,‛ ‚the discourse of those who have no glory, or of those who have lost it and who now find themselves, perhaps for a time—but probably for a long time—in darkness and silence.‛14 A counter-his- tory is not the history of victories, but the history of defeats. As Foucault remarks, it is linked to those ‚epic, religious, or mythical forms which “formulate the misfortune of ancestors, exiles, and servitude;‛ it ‚is much closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans.‛15 While an official history keeps entire groups of peoples and their lives and experiences ‚in darkness and silence,‛ a counter-history teaches us precisely how to listen to those silent and dark moments. But how do we learn to listen to silence? In an earlier essay, ‚What is an Author?,‛16 Foucault offers helpful remarks about how to fight against the ‘omissions‛ and active oblivion produced by discursive practices, that is, how to listen to lost voices that have been silenced or coopted in such a way that certain meanings were lost or never heard. Foucault is particularly interested in those forms of silencing produced by a discursive practice which, far from being accidental, are in fact foundational and constitutive. Those are constitutive silences, for the discursive practice proceeds in the way it does and acquires its distinctive normative structure by virtue of the exclusions that it produces, by virtue of those silenced voices and occluded meanings that let the official voices and meanings dominate the discursive space. Omissions and silences are foundational, a constitutive part of ‚the origin‛ or ‚the initiation‛ of a discursive practice. For that reason, the fight against those exclusions requires ‚a return to the origin‛: If we return, it is because of a basic and constructive omission that is not the result of accident or incomprehension.” This non-accidental omission must be regulated by precise operations that can be situated, analyzed, and reduced in a return to the act of initiation.17 Foucault distinguishes this critical ‚return to the origin‛ from mere ‚rediscoveries‛ and mere ‚reactivations‛: a rediscovery promotes ‚the perception of forgotten or obscured figures;‛18 and a reactivation involves ‚the insertion of discourse into totally new domains of generalization, practices, and transformation.‛19 By contrast, an attempt to transform a discursive practice deeply from the inside by resisting its silences and omissions requires a ‚return to the origin.‛ This critical return involves revisiting the texts that have come to be considered foundational, ‚the primary points of reference‛ of the practice, and developing a new way of reading them, so as to train our eyes and ears to new meanings and voices: we pay ‚particular attention to those things registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading plenitude.‛20 Foucault emphasizes that the modifications introduced by this critical return to the origin are not merely ‚a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and re- double it in the form of an ornament which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice.‛21 If rediscoveries and reactivations of the past are crucial for extending discursive practices, a ‚return to the origin‛ that unveils omissions and silences is what is required for a deep transformation of our meaning-making capacities within those practices. The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences, to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frame- works. Lacking that ability is a strong indication of one’s inability to resist epistemic and socio-political subjugation, of the limitations on one’s agency and positionality within discursive practices. And the ability to inhabit discursive practices critically that we develop by becoming sensitive to exclusions—by listening to silences— enables us not to be trapped into discursive practices, that is, it gives us also the ability to develop counter-discourses. Indeed, being able to negotiate historical narratives and to resist imposed interpretations of one’s past means being able to develop counter-histories. Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledge: it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices of those peoples who have lived their life ‚in darkness and silence.‛

#### This environmental dualism results in total destruction of the Earth

**The Dark Mountain 9** – network of artists, writers, and thinkers (The Dark Mountain Manifesto, “The Severed Hand,” 2009, <http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/>) //RGP

The myth of progress is founded on the myth of nature. The first tells us that we are destined for greatness; the second tells us that greatness is cost-free. Each is intimately bound up with the other. Both tell us that we are apart from the world; that we began grunting in the primeval swamps, as a humble part of something called ‘nature’, which we have now triumphantly subdued. The very fact that we have a word for ‘nature’ is [5] evidence that we do not regard ourselves as part of it. Indeed, our separation from it is a myth integral to the triumph of our civilisation. We are, we tell ourselves, the only species ever to have attacked nature and won. In this, our unique glory is contained. Outside the citadels of self-congratulation, lone voices have cried out against this infantile version of the human story for centuries, but it is only in the last few decades that its inaccuracy has become laughably apparent. We are the first generations to grow up surrounded by evidence that our attempt to separate ourselves from ‘nature’ has been a grim failure, proof not of our genius but our hubris. The attempt to sever the hand from the body has endangered the ‘progress’ we hold so dear, and it has endangered much of ‘nature’ too. The resulting upheaval underlies the crisis we now face. We imagined ourselves isolated from the source of our existence. The fallout from this imaginative error is all around us: a quarter of the world’s mammals are threatened with imminent extinction; an acre and a half of rainforest is felled every second; 75% of the world’s fish stocks are on the verge of collapse; humanity consumes 25% more of the world’s natural ‘products’ than the Earth can replace — a figure predicted to rise to 80% by mid-century. Even through the deadening lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us. And over it all looms runaway climate change. Climate change, which threatens to render all human projects irrelevant; which presents us with detailed evidence of our lack of understanding of the world we inhabit while, at the same time, demonstrating that we are still entirely reliant upon it. Climate change, which highlights in painful colour the head-on crash between civilisation and ‘nature’; which makes plain, more effectively than any carefully constructed argument or optimistically defiant protest, how the machine’s need for permanent growth will require us to destroy ourselves in its name. Climate change, which brings home at last our ultimate powerlessness. These are the facts, or some of them. Yet facts never tell the whole story. (‘Facts’, Conrad wrote, in Lord Jim, ‘as if facts could prove anything.’) The facts of environmental crisis we hear so much about often conceal as much as they expose. We hear daily about the impacts of our activities on ‘the environment’ (like ‘nature’, this is an expression which distances us from the reality of our situation). Daily we hear, too, of the many ‘solutions’ to these problems: solutions which usually involve the necessity of urgent political agreement and a judicious application of human technological genius. Things may be changing, runs the narrative, but there is nothing we cannot deal with here, folks. We perhaps need to move faster, more urgently. Certainly we need to accelerate the pace of research and development. We accept that we must become more ‘sustainable’. But everything will be fine. There will still be growth, there will still be progress: these things will continue, because they have to continue, so they cannot do anything but continue. There is nothing to see here. Everything will be fine. We do not believe that everything will be fine. We are not even sure, based on current definitions of progress and improvement, that we want it to be. Of all humanity’s delusions of difference, of its separation from and superiority to the living world which surrounds it, one distinction holds up better than most: we may well be the first species capable of effectively eliminating life on Earth. This is a hypothesis we seem intent on putting to the test. We are already responsible for denuding the world of much of its richness, magnificence, beauty, colour and magic, and we show no sign of slowing down. For a very long time, we imagined that ‘nature’ was something that happened elsewhere. The damage we did to it might be regrettable, but needed to be weighed against the benefits here and now. And in the worst case scenario, there would always be some kind of Plan B. Perhaps we would make for the moon, where we could survive in lunar colonies under giant bubbles as we planned our expansion across the galaxy. But there is no Plan B and the bubble, it turns out, is where we have been living all the while. The bubble is that delusion of isolation under which we have laboured for so long. The bubble has cut us off from life on the only planet we have, or are ever likely to have. The bubble is civilisation. Consider the structures on which that bubble has been built. Its foundations are geological: coal, oil, gas — millions upon millions of years of ancient sunlight, dragged from the depths of the planet and burned with abandon. On this base, the structure stands. Move upwards, and you pass through a jumble of supporting horrors: battery chicken sheds; industrial abattoirs; burning forests; beam-trawled ocean floors; dynamited reefs; hollowed-out mountains; wasted soil. Finally, on top of all these unseen layers, you reach the well-tended surface where you and I stand: unaware, or uninterested, in what goes on beneath us; demanding that the authorities keep us in the manner to which we have been accustomed; occasion- ally feeling twinges of guilt that lead us to buy organic chickens or locally-produced lettuces; yet for the most part glutted, but not sated, on the fruits of the horrors on which our lifestyles depend.

#### All forms of exclusion are patterned off the human/non-human divide- de-normalizing the anthropocentric order is critical to challenging the endless war on difference

**Kochi, 9** (Tarik, Sussex law school, Species war: Law, Violence and Animals, Law Culture and Humanities Oct 5.3)//RSW

This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good. For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. “Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized. Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normal-ized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s norm-alization.

#### 4. Pure alt framing is key

**Kochi and Ordan 08 –** (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>) Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can only happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

#### Their elevation of rights makes the category of the “human” larger – this drawing of lines only reinforces a boundary between humans and animals

**Deckha 10** – Associate Professor at the University of Victoria Faculty of Law in Victoria, Canada (Maneesha, The Scavenger, “It’s time to abandon the idea of ‘human’ rights,” 12/13/2010, <http://www.thescavenger.net/animals/its-time-to-abandon-the-idea-of-human-rights-77234-536.html>) //RGP

One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it. The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.